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2005 / Recent Developments
CONSTITUTIONALIZING TOBACCO: THE AMBIVALENCE OF EUROPEAN FEDERALISM

INTRODUCTION

The Treaty Establishing the European Community' announces the principle that the powers of the European Community ("Community") are limited
to those specifically conferred on it: "The Community shall act within the
limits of powers conferred upon it by this Treaty and of the objectives assigned to it therein." 2 However, experience has shown that, in practice, the
3
allocation of power between the Community decisionmaker and Member
States is neither clear nor immutable. For example, there is a traditional perception that it is the responsibility of the Community decisionmaker to implement internal market regulations in order to promote the "free movement of
5
goods" 4 and the "free movement of persons, services, and capital," while
6
individual Member States retain autonomy in regulating public health. The
7
European Constitution has also formally embraced this longstanding private (market regulation) versus public (health regulation) dichotomy, using
it to divide competences formally. 8 However, the public/private distinction
is hazy, as reflected by the history of the Community decisionmaker's regulation of tobacco. Regulation of the manufacture and advertisement of tobacco
products necessarily implicates both free market and public health concerns,
and a given regulation may be characterized as a market measure in some
circumstances and as a public health measure in others.
In its Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, 9 the Community attempts to clarify the allocation of competences. Article 111-278 of the Draft

1. TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, Dec. 24, 2002, 2002 O.J. (C 325) 33 [hereinafter EC TREATY].
2. EC TREATY art. 5.1.
3. The "Community decisionmaker" is a term of art that refers to the complex legislative process of
the European Community. This process involves participation by the European Council, the European
Commission, and the European Parliament, in consultation or co-decisionmaking processes. See generally
GEORGE A. BERMANN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EUROPEAN UNION LAW 75 (2d ed. 2002).
4. EC TREATY tit. I.
5. EC TREATY tit. III.
6. See Daniela Caruso, Private Law and Public Stakes in European Integration: The Case of Property, 10
EUR. L.J. 751 (2004). See also Ernest A. Young, Protecting Member State Autonomy in the European Union:
Some CautionaryTales from American Federalism, 77 N.YU.L. REv. 1612 (2002).
7. The decision to create a convention to draft an E.U. Constitution was made at the Laeken European
Council. See generally Presidency Conclusions, European Council Meeting at Laeken (Dec. 14-15, 2001),
6
availableat http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms.Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/ 8827.pdf (last visited Apr. 20, 2005). For
an overview of the constitutional convention and the drafting process, see The European Convention,
Organisation, at http://european-convention.eu.int/organisation.asp?lang=EN (last visited Apr. 20, 2005).
8. See Daniela Caruso, The Missing View of the Cathedral: The Private Law Paradigmof European Legal Integration,3 EUR. L.J. 3, 7-8 (1997); Caruso, supra note 6, at 751-53.
9. TREATY ESTABLISHING A CONSTITUTION FOR EUROPE, Dec. 16, 2004, 2004 O.J. (C 310) 1 [hereinafter DRAFT E.U. CONSTITUTION).
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E.U. Constitution ("Public Health Article") is a public health provision that
expressly refers to the regulation of tobacco:
5. European laws or framework laws may also establish incentive measures designed to protect and improve human health and in particular to
combat the major cross-border health scourges, as well as measures which
have as their direct objective the protection of public health regarding
tobacco and the abuse of alcohol, excluding any harmonisation of the
laws and regulations of the Member States. They shall be adopted after
consultation of the Committee of the Regions and the Economic and
Social Committee.10
To many, the Public Health Article reflects a shift toward European federalism by guaranteeing greater power to Member States over their national
health regulations while limiting the power of the Community legislature.
We argue that in reality, however, this "constitutionalization" of tobacco does
not guarantee Member States' autonomy. As long as the Community decisionmaker can standardize national tobacco laws whenever the functioning
of the internal market is at stake, the Community will exercise some degree
of control over States' national health standards.
Part I of this Recent Development charts the progress of tobacco regulation through Community-issued directives," harmonization,"2 and the early
jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice ("ECJ"). 13 Part II describes
the struggle over the allocation of competences and the illusory public/private
distinction, reflected in Federal Republic of Germany v. Parliamentand Council
("Tobacco Advertising Judgment"), 14 The Queen v. Secretary of State for Health
ex parte British American Tobacco (Investments) Ltd. ("Tobacco Products Judgment"), 15 and in cases now pending before the ECJ. 16 Part III discusses the
constitutionalization of tobacco and the ambiguity it engenders with respect
to the Community's federal structure. On the one hand, the Public Health

10. DRAFT E.U. CONSTITUTION art. 111-278,
5.
11. Directives are legal instruments issued by the Community decisionmaker that bind States to a
concrete goal. They are distinct from regulations in that States can choose precisely which national instruments to implement in order to achieve that goal. SeePAUL CRAIG & GRAINNE DE B6RCA, EU LAW:
TEXT, CASES, AND MATERIALS 114-15 (3d ed. 2003).
12.
The Council shall, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the
European Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee, issue directives for the approximation of such laws, regulations or administrative provisions of the Member States as directly affect the
establishment or functioning of the common market.
EC TREATY arts. 94-95.
13. The European Court ofJustice has jurisdiction to review the Community decisionmaker's acts and
determine whether they are supported by legal competence or legal basis. EC TREATY art. 230.
14. Case C-376/98, Federal Republic of Germany v. Parliament and Council, 2000 E.C.R. 1-08419.
15. Case C-491/01, The Queen v. Sec'y of State for Health ex parte British American Tobacco (Investments) Ltd., 2002 E.C.R. 1-11453.
16. Case C-380/03, Federal Republic of Germany v. Parliament and Council, 2003 O.J. (C 275) 31;
Case T-311/03, Nurburgring GmbH v. Parliament and Council, 2003 O.J. (C 275) 48.
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Article can be used as a sword by the Community legislature, allowing intervention of a complementary and supportive nature. Community action
may include "monitoring, early warning of and combating serious cross-border
threats to health." 17 On the other hand, the Public Health Article may be
used as a shield by States seeking to preserve their disparate public health
standards. The Community thus bears the burden of proving that its proposed
legislation is actually a market correction measure (rather than a disguised
18
health measure) and does not violate the Subsidiarity Principle. Because of
this ambiguity, the provision remains open to interpretation and is susceptible to policy arguments made by either side. Consequently, the constitutionalization of tobacco fails to clarify the allocation of competences and provides
little guidance in determining the substantive outcomes of pending disputes.
I. REGULATING TOBACCO: FROM FREE MOVEMENT TO PUBLIC HEALTH

A. Blurring Boundaries:Anti-Tobacco Policies and Internal Market Directives
Although the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 formally granted the Commu19
nity decisionmaker competence to address public health, the Community
had been instituting anti-tobacco initiatives since 1986.20 One such initiative, the "Europe Against Cancer Program," was adopted by the Council and
Member States' representatives. 21 It consisted of a three-step fight against misinformation about tobacco consumption to be implemented across three time
periods: 1985-1990 (information and public awareness); 1990-94 (prevention
of tobacco consumption among targeted groups22and in the workplace); and
1996-2001 (information and health education).
In addition to addressing public health, the Community also addressed
the free movement of tobacco products prior to the Maastricht Treaty. Beginning in the late 1980s, the European Commission drafted a series of to-

l(b).
17. DRAFT E.U. CONSTITUTION art. 111-278,
18. The Subsidiarity Principle was initially enshrined in the Article 5 of the EC Treaty:
In areas which do not fall within its exclusive Competence, the Community shall take action, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only if and in so faras the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can therefore, by reason of the scale or
effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by the Community.
EC TREATY art. 5. This provides only a procedural approach to determining issues of subsidiarity, rather
than substantive criteria to apply. For the complexities generated by this approach, see George A. Bermann, Taking Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalismin the European Community and the UnitedStates, 94 COLUM.
L. REV. 332 (1994) and H. Collins, European Private Law and CulturalIdentity of States, 3 EUR. REV. PRIVATE L. 353 (1995).
19. See EC TREATY art. 129 (as in effect 1992) (now article 152). See also STEPHEN WEATHERILL &
PAUL BEAUMONT, EU LAW 14 (1999).
20. CATHERINE BARNARD, THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW OF THE EU: THE FOUR FREEDOMS 494 (2004).
See also Tamara K. Hervey, Up in Smoke? Community (Anti)-Tobacco Law and Policy, 26 EUR. L. REV. 101,
117-21 (2001).
21. Resolution of the Council and the Representatives of the Governments of the Member States,
meeting within the Council, of July 7,1986, on a Programme of Action of the European Communities
Against Cancer, 1986 O.J. (C 184) 19.
22. Id.
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bacco directives that harmonized domestic laws that presumably constituted
barriers to trade.2 3 The explicit goal of these directives, which were subsequently adopted by the Council, was to liberalize and increase the free movement of tobacco products between Member States. Perhaps surprisingly,
these internal market directives did not conflict directly with the public
health efforts formalized by the Community in its Europe Against Cancer
Program. In fact, both initiatives were designed to harmonize the laws for
the sale, manufacture, and advertisement of tobacco products within the
internal market, while also increasing the level of public health protection
24
for consumers.
The market directives adopted during this period addressed three major
tobacco product issues: labeling, manufacturing, and advertising. The European Commission began harmonizing health information and warnings on
cigarette labels in 1989 by adopting Council Directive 89/622/EC ("Tobacco
Labeling Directive"). 25 This directive required that consumer tobacco products be marked with health warning labels indicating the products' tar and
nicotine yields. It was extended in a subsequent directive regulating all to26
bacco products consumed orally (primarily smokeless and chewing tobacco).
Regarding the manufacture of tobacco products, in 1990 the Commission
adopted a directive fixing the maximum tar yield of cigarettes. 27 This measure was later amended by Council Directive 2001/37/EC ("Tobacco Products
Directive"), which harmonized the laws, regulations, and administrative provisions of Member States that concerned tobacco products.28 The Community's
regulation of tobacco product advertising began in 1989 with the "Television Without Frontiers" directive, which imposed a general ban on television
advertising of tobacco. 29 Subsequently, the Community adopted its wellknown "Tobacco Advertising Directive. '"30 The ECJ ruled, however, that the
Tobacco Advertising Directive was really a disguised public health measure
rather than an internal market regulation. In its Tobacco Advertising Judgment, the Court voided the directive for lack of legislative competence. 31 In
response to the ruling, the Council approved a new, modified directive that
harmonized the advertising and sponsorship of tobacco products. 32 This lat23. The Community's authority to harmonize domestic laws that directly affected the establishment
or functioning of the common market can be found in Articles 94-95 of the EC Treaty.
24. For a criticism of this approach to harmonization, see Gunther Teubner, Legal Irritants:Good Faith
in British Law or How Unifying Law Ends Up in New Divergences, 61 MOD. L. REV. It (1998). Teubner
addresses the paradoxes of the harmonization of contract law by demonstrating that the process deepens
Europe's local and economic cleavages rather than unifies law.
25. Council Directive 89/622/EC, 1989 O.J. (L 359) 1.
26. Council Directive 92/41/EC, 1992 O.J. (L 158) 30.
27. Council Directive 90/239/EC, 1990 O.J. (L 137) 36.
28. Council Directive 89/622/EC and Council Directive 90/239/EC were recast in 2001 as Council
Directive 2001/37/EC, 2001 O.J. (L 194) 26.
29. Council Directive 89/552/EC, 1989 O.J. (L 298) 23.
30. Council Directive 98/43/EC, 1998 O.J. (L 213) 9.
31. Case C-376/98, Federal Republic of Germany v. Parliament and Council, 2000 E.C.R. 1-8419.
32. Council Directive 2003/33/EC, 2003 O.J. (L 152) 16.
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est measure, still highly controversial among E.U. lawyers, technocrats, and
politicians, has recently been challenged in several cases pending before the
33
ECJ.
This history of tobacco regulation demonstrates that a clear dichotomy
between public health and* internal market regulation is untenable. Each
directive aimed at promoting the common market by,harmonizing the labeling, manufacturing, or advertising of tobacco products inevitably affected
public health matters as well.
B. HarmonizationApproaches and Community Preemption of Member State Law
In interpreting European directives and the articles of the EC Treaty, the
ECJ has generated a body of case law addressing both the extent to which
the "Free Movement of Goods" provisions can void Member States' disparate
regulations 34 and the power of the Community decisionmaker to harmonize
Member States' laws. 35 European lawyers and political scientists have identified
two opposite trends in European integration: "positive" and "negative" integration. 36 The process of negative integration through "market-making" measures is advanced by supranational institutions. It consists of market deregulation through the elimination of trade barriers and facilitates the free movement of goods, capital, services, and persons. The pressures of negative integration have severely limited Member States' capacities to protect their social welfare models because they have, according to Fritz Scharpf, limited
options to "influence growth and employment in the economies for whose
performance they are politically accountable." 37 National laws that oppose
the free movement of goods, services, capital, and labor need particularly
38
strong public interest justifications in order to survive ECJ scrutiny. Even
when such a justification is found, the Community has the competence to
re-regulate, or even take over, that particular field if the national law opposes
39
free movement.
Positive integration through "market-correcting" measures occurs at the
Community level. In 1986, the Single European Act expanded the Community's majority voting procedure. 40 In 1992, the Maastricht Treaty expanded
the competences of the European Union, making it easier for the Community decisionmaker to adopt harmonization provisions in the areas of social

33. Case C-380/03, Federal Republic of Germany v. Parliament and Council, 2003 O.J. (C 275) 31;
Case T-311/03, Ndirburgring GmbH v. Parliament and Council, 2003 OJ. (C 275) 48.
34. See EC TREATY arts. 28-30.
35. See EC TREATY art. 93.
36. See FRITZ W. SCHARPF, GOVERNING IN EUROPE: EFFECTIVE AND DEMOCRATIC? 43-83 (1999).
37. Fritz W. Scharpf, The European Social Model, in INTEGRATION IN AN EXPANDING EUROPEAN UNION 109, 112 (Joseph H. H. Weiler et al. eds., 2003).
38. See THOMAS C. FISCHER, THE EUROPEANIZATION OF AMERICA: WHAT AMERICANS NEED TO
KNow ABOUT THE EUROPEAN UNION 81-91 (1996).

39. See EC TREATY art. 95.
40. See CRAIG, supra note 11, at 19-20; EC TREATY art. 95.
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and consumer policy. 41 The motivation behind the expansion of Community
competence was the desire to play a greater role in promoting the public
42
interest of European citizens within the internal market.
The ECJ has been at the helm of advancing both processes of negative and
positive integration through its interpretation of the core legal provisions of
the EC Treaty and European directives. Professor Miguel Maduro notes that
two concepts were present in the ECJ's interpretation of Article 28 of the EC
Treaty: creating refined criteria to prevent state protectionism, and relying
on the general notion of a European Economic Constitution to limit state
interventionism and support Community decisionmaking. 4 3 Through its
interpretation, the ECJ affirmed its role as a European federal judiciary and
mediated disputes arising from conflict between national welfare regimes
44
and the neo-liberal European Economic Constitution.
The Court, in coordination with the European Commission, elaborated several different approaches to harmonization of Member States' laws. The most
well-known approach to harmonization is mutual recognition, whereby a product or service lawfully marketed in one Member State is allowed to circulate
in all other Member States. This principle emerged in the early jurisprudence of
the ECJ, 45 and it decentralized standard-setting and increased regulatory
competition among Member States. European legal scholarship is divided on
the economic and political consequences of mutual recognition. One side
argues that the approach causes product standards to reach very high levels
of protection in fields such as foodstuffs regulations, consumer law, and work
safety, because Member States benefit from the opportunity to adapt gradually to non-mandatory regulations and learn from one another.46 The opposing
side argues that mutual recognition legitimizes a trend toward deregulation.
A race to the bottom may result from the promotion of free markets and

41. See CRAIG, supra note 11, at 22-24. See also Paul Craig, The Evolution of the Single Market, in THE
UNPACKING THE PREMISES 1, 29 (Catherine Barnard &
Joanne Scott eds., 2002) [hereinafter LAw OF THE SINGLE EUROPEAN MARKET].
42. See EC TREATY art. 95 (introducing majority voting for harmonization measures). See also id. arts.
152-53 (expanding the competence of the European Union for consumer protection and public health).
43. See MIGUEL P. MADURO, WE, THE COURT: THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE AND THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC CONSTITUTION 58-60 (1998) (describing the European Economic Constitution as "built on
the free market, open competition, and a particular view of the kinds of regulation that are acceptable").
44. Id. at 1-3.
45. See Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentral v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung
rfie
Branntwein, E.C.R. 649 (1979)
(holding that a German law, which precluded the sale of a French liqueur, was incompatible with Article
28 of the EC Treaty). The Court
not only asserted its competence to assess the intrinsic reasonableness of all national . .. product
regulations that could have a negative impact on ... trade, but it also announced the new rule of
mutual recognition: [with few exceptions) ... products lawfully marketed in one member state must
LAW OF THE SINGLE EUROPEAN MARKET:

be admitted in all member states ....

By judicial fiat, . . . the freedom to sell and to consume ...

achieved constitutional protection ....
SCHARPF, supra note 36, at 56.
46. See generally GOOD GOVERNANCE IN EUROPE'S INTEGRATED MARKET (Christian Joerges & Renaud
Dehousse eds., 2002); Kenneth A. Armstrong, Mutual Recognition, in LAw OF THE SINGLE EUROPEAN
MARKET, supra note 41, at 225.
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consumer choice-if lower-quality products are free to circulate among coun47
tries, they will outsell and push out the more expensive, higher-quality goods.
Other harmonization approaches-for example, comprehensive, optional,
and minimum harmonization-generally involve replacing divergent national rules with a single E.U. regulation. In employing these approaches,
the Community decisionmaker must strike a balance between protecting beneficial common interests and liberalizing and improving the functioning of
the single market. Each approach invokes a different type of Community
preemption, and each has faced challenge in some controversy before the
ECJ. The key question the Court had to answer in those cases was whether
Member States could adopt disparate standards-particularly ones higher
than those set by the Community.
For example, comprehensive harmonization by European directives bars
Member States from adopting any type of supplementary regulation. In Pubblico Ministero v. Ratti,48 the ECJ clarified that the labeling rules laid down in
a directive regulating the classification, packaging, and labeling of dangerous goods 49 applied uniformly to domestic andimported products. The ECJ
based its decision on the free-competition argument-namely, that partial
harmonization would lead to discrimination and threaten the free movement
of goods.
In contrast, many harmonization directives addressing environmental, consumer, and employee protection used a minimum harmonization approach
instead. These directives can explicitly or implicitly allow Member States to
adopt tailored rules if they wish to achieve higher standards. However, minimum harmonization remains a questionable approach. ECJ jurisprudence in
this area is controversial, and directives are not uniformly interpreted. When
the interests of markets are at odds with those of public health, as in the case
of tobacco regulation, the Community decisionmaker has achieved, at best,
an uneasy compromise through minimum harmonization. 50
C. Conflicting Interpretationsof the Tobacco Labeling Directive
The problem of non-uniform interpretation of tobacco regulation harmonization began with two ECJ cases 5' in which the ECJ interpreted two
47. SeeBERMANN ET AL., supra note 3, at 518. However, Fritz Scharpf is still skeptical of the idea that
European Community institutions are more effective problem-solvers than their democratic, national
counterparts. See GOVERNING IN EUROPE, Supra note 36, at 63-64.
48. Case 148/78, Pubblico Ministero v. Ratti, 1979 E.C.R. 1629.
49. Council Directive 73/173/EC, 1973 O.J. (L 189) 7.
50. The regulation of chemicals in the European Union provides another example of this principle at
work. See Jean-Philippe Montfort, The EU Chemicals Policy Review from a Legal Perspective: For a Progressive,
Coherent and Integrated Approach that Preserves the Internal Market of Chemicals, at http://www.khlaw.
com/index.cfm?fuseaction=publications.showPubDetail&publD=805 (Oct. 15, 2002) (last visited Apr.
20, 2005). But see Stravros Dimas, European Commissioner for the Environment, The Rationale of REACH,
PARLIAMENT MAG., Apr. 11, 2005, at 28, 29, available at http://www.parliamentmag.com/content/
201/parl28-29.pdf (last visited Apr. 20, 2005).
51. Case C-11/92, The Queen v. Sec'y of State for Health exparte Gallaher Ltd., 1993 E.C.R. 1-3545;
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different provisions of the Tobacco Labeling Directive. 52 Ironically, although
the ECJ delivered both verdicts on the same day, the judgments rendered
appear incompatible.
In Gallaher Ltd.,53 the British government had adopted regulations mandating that indications of tar and nicotine levels and health warnings cover
six percent of the surface area of the packet, exceeding the four percent directive requirement. 54 However, in accordance with the directive's free movement
clause, 55 the U.K. regulations provided that imported cigarettes from another Member State were acceptable if they carried warnings in English that
met the requirements of their state of origin. Plaintiffs argued that this unequal treatment between British and non-British retailers led to reverse discrimination in favor of non-British tobacco manufacturers. 56 The ECJ dismissed this argument, holding the U.K. regulations valid in light of "the
by the provision in question, which laid down
degree of harmonization sought
' 57
minimum requirements. "
In Philip Morris,58 the ECJ's interpretation of another provision of the Tobacco Labeling Directive used a very different approach to harmonization.
Article 4(2) of the Tobacco Labeling Directive required that a large portion
of each tobacco packet carry warnings to be selected from those on a specific
list. 59 The Italian government interpreted the plural word "warnings" in
Article 4(2) as enabling it to require the printing of multiple warnings whose
total surface area met the four percent requirement. 60 Several foreign tobacco
manufacturers challenged this interpretation because allowing Italian tobacco manufacturers to split the four percent surface area between two smaller
warnings gave them a competitive advantage. The ECJ held that Italy was
not implementing the directive correctly and rejected a minimum harmonization approach, in light of "a number of interpretative criteria based on the
literal meaning of Article 4(2) of the directive and on its context." 61 The
Court recognized that not all of the provisions of the Tobacco Labeling Directive set minimum standards. Some set exact standards (as in the maximum harmonization approach). Contrary to the interpretation offered by the
Italian government, the ECJ held that Article 4(2) "provides only for the use
62
of a single specific warning."
Case C-222/91, Ministero delle Finanze and Ministero della Sanita v. Philip Morris Belgium SA, 1993
E.C.R. 1-3469.
52. Council Directive 89/6221EC, 1989 O.J. (L 359) 1.
53. Gallaher Ltd., 1993 E.C.R. 1-3545.
54. Council Directive 89/622/EC, art. 4, 1989 OJ.(L 359) 1.
55. Id. art. 8.
56. Gallaher Ltd., 1993 E.C.R. 1-3545.
22.
57. Id. at 1-3566,
58. Case C-222/91, Ministero delle Finanze and Ministero della Sanita v. Philip Morris Belgium SA,
1993 E.C.R. 1-3469.
59. Council Directive 89/622/EC, art. 4, 1989 OJ.(L 359) 1.
3.
60. Philip Morris, 1993 E.C.R. at 1-3505,
61. Id. at 1-3509, 24.
62. Id. at 1-3510, 28.
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These two cases demonstrate that the implementation of European directives may give rise to conflicting interpretations by the same court. The Italian
government's actions in Philip Morris challenge the widespread perception that a
minimum harmonization approach, which gives greater leeway to Member
States to implement the directive, will result in stricter public health standards.
Moreover, in order to achieve similar substantive results (i.e., protecting
foreign manufacturers, and thus free movement), the ECJ supported minimum harmonization in one case but not in the other. Taken together, the
two decisions do not conclusively advocate for Member State autonomy nor
for greater Community power.
II.

THE STRUGGLE OVER THE ALLOCATION OF COMPETENCES BETWEEN
THE COMMUNITY AND ITS MEMBER STATES

A. Tobacco AdvertisingJudgment: ECJ Adjudication DecentralizesE. U. Power
The Tobacco Advertising Judgment, 63 handed down in 2000, marked an
important shift in the evolution of E.U. law. For the first time, the ECJ
struck down a European directive for lacking a legal basis. The Court, which
had actively expanded the power of the Community legislature in areas where
its competences were relatively weak, 64 surprisingly annulled the Tobacco Advertising Directive65 and deferred to Member States' powers. 66 European legal
scholars wrote extensively about the Tobacco Advertising Judgment. They
emphasized that it signaled an important shift in European federalism and
altered the balance of competences between the European Union and its Mem67
ber States.
The difficulty with which the Tobacco Advertising Directive was passedthe process took almost ten years-explains why this ECJ judgment proved
so contentious. Tobacco regulation at the Community level was first proposed in 1984.68 Although the European Parliament amended this proposal
in 1990 with the goal of a "total ban on tobacco advertising," the Commis-

63. Case C-376/98, Federal Republic of Germany v. Parliament and Council, 2000 E.C.R. 1-8419.
64. See, e.g., Stephen Weatherill, The European Commission's Green Paper on European Contract Law: Context,
Content and Constitutionality, 24 J. CONSUMER POL'Y, 339, 358-59 (2001). See also STEPHEN WEATHERILL,
EC CONSUMER LAW AND POLICY 44-47 (1997).
65. Council Directive 98/43(EC, 1998 O.J. (L 213) 9.
66. See Fernanda Nicola, Multilevel Governance Alliances in the Harmonization of European Contract
Law, Paper Presented at Rethinking Ideology & Strategy: Progressive Lawyering, Globalization and
Markets (Northeastern University, Boston, Mass., Nov. 6-8, 2003), 11-15 (on file with Harvard International Law Journal).
67. See Geraint G. Howells, Federalism in USA and EC-The Scope of Harmonised Legislative Activity
Compared, 5 EUR. REV. PRIVATE L., 601, 604-05 (2002); Craig, supra note 41, at 32-33; Stephen Weatherill, The Commission's Options for Developing EC Consumer Protectionand Contract Law: Assessing the Constitutional Basis, 13 EUR. Bus. L. REV. 497, 503-05 (2002) (explaining that in annulling the tobacco advertising directive, the ECJ reaffirmed that "there is no carte blanche to harmonise national laws, but rather
only a power to harmonise to achieve defined ends," id. at 504).
68. See Germany, 2000 E.C.R. at 1-8428, 14.
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sion "viewed a complete ban as premature." 69 However, a second, modified
directive drafted in 1991 did propose a total ban on advertising. 70 When the
European Council considered the ban, minority interests blocked its adoption. The Legal Service of the Council 7' also opposed the proposal on the
grounds that the Community clearly lacked competence. Fourteen consecutive Health Councils could not arrive at a compromise. Finally, the parties
reached a breakthrough in 1997 when Greece agreed to vote in favor of the
directive. Once the directive was published in the Official Journal, Germany,
fearing the expansion of Community competence at the expense of Member
72
States' autonomy, challenged it before the ECJ.
Germany alleged that the primary goal of the directive was not market
harmonization but public health, an area of regulation belonging to Member
States. 73 The ECJ ruled that the Community legislature could not use Article 95 of the EC Treaty as a legal basis for harmonizing Member States' laws:
[T]he measures referred to in Article 100a(1) [now Article 95(1)] of the
Treaty are intended to improve the conditions for the establishment and
functioning of the internal market. To construe that article as meaning
that it vests in the Community legislature a general power to regulate
the internal market would not only be contrary to the express wording
of the provisions cited above [Articles 3c and 7a (now 3(1)(c) and 14,
respectively)] but would also be incompatible with the principle embodied in Article 3b of the EC Treaty (now Article 5 EC) that the powers of the Community are limited to those specifically conferred on it. 74
The Court found that since tobacco advertising was predominantly local,
non-standardized advertising presented no appreciable obstacle to trade or
unfair competition. The ECJ judgment embraced the opinion of AdvocateGeneral Nial Fennelly, who claimed that differences among the tobacco advertising regulations of Member States did not justify a total ban on tobacco
76
advertising. 75 The complete ban on "all forms of advertising and sponsorship"
included banning modes of advertising that were only local in scope, such as
advertising on posters, ashtrays, and parasols, and publicity at non-major
sporting events. Eradication of those types of advertising did not address
large-scale, cross-border effects that might have caused appreciable distortions
of competition. Consequently, the ECJ annulled the Tobacco Advertising

69. Id. at 1-8429,
16.
70. See Modified Proposal for a Council Directive on Advertising for Tobacco Products, 1991 O.J. (C
167) 3; Germany, 2000 E.C.R. at 1-8430,
17.
71. This is the office of general counsel for the Commission. See generally The European CommissionLegal Service, at htrp://europa.eu.int/comm/dgs/legal_service/index_en.hrm (last visited Apr. 20, 2005).
72. Germany, 2000 E.C.R. 1-8419.
73. See id. at 1-8512, 77 31-32.
74. Id. at 1-8524, 83.
75. Id. at 1-8495-96, IT 177-179.
76. Council Directive 98/43/EC, art. 3(1), 1998 O.J. (L 213) 9, 10.
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Directive for its lack of legal basis on the grounds that the directive was a
disguised health measure rather than an internal market provision. The Tobacco Advertising Judgment seemed to be a clear signal that the Court would
allow Member States greater discretion in the regulation of public health at
the expense of the Community legislature's power.
Nevertheless, the ECJ ruling left an opening for a new directive in case future
barriers to cross-border trade arose from tobacco advertising in periodicals
and at sponsorship events.7 7 Not surprisingly, a few months after the Tobacco
Advertising Judgment, the Community drafted a new directive that banned

tobacco advertising for all printed publications, Internet services, radio
broadcasting, and sponsorship events with cross-border effects. 78 It explained
that "differences in national legislation" would probably pose "barriers to
the free movement" of products and services, and that such "barriers should
be eliminated." 79 It stated that in the case of press advertising and sponsorship of "major sporting and cultural events," such barriers had in fact "al-

ready been noted. '"80 This new tobacco advertising directive was approved
and published in 2003.81
B. Tobacco ProductsJudgment: An Unclear Shift in European Federalism
Following the Tobacco Advertising Judgment, the Tobacco Products Di-

rective, 82 which aimed at harmonizing various aspects of the manufacture,
sale, and presentation of tobacco products, was swiftly challenged because of
its apparent incompatibility with the ECJ ruling. The case was brought by

83
several tobacco manufacturers before a U.K. tribunal and referred to the ECJ.
The Tobacco Products Directive contained three main areas of legislation.
First, the directive reduced and harmonized the maximum tar, nicotine, and
84
carbon monoxide yields in cigarettes to 10mg, lmg, and 10mg, respectively,
in addition to prohibiting the manufacture of products in Europe that did

not comply with these established yields. 85 Second, the directive harmonized
labeling requirements and mandated the printing of conspicuous warnings
regarding tar, nicotine, and carbon monoxide content. 86 Third, it prohibited
77. Germany, 2000 E.C.R. at 1-8527-28,
98.
78. Council Directive 2003/33/EC, 2003 O.J. (L 152) 16.
79. Id. at 16,
1-2.
80. Id. at 16, 1.
81. Council Directive 2003133/EC, 2003 O.J. (L 152) 16.
82. Council Directive 2001/37/EC, 2001 O.J. (L 194) 26.
83. Case C-491/01, The Queen v. Sec'y of State for Health exparte British American Tobacco (Investments) Ltd., 2002 E.C.R. 1-11453.
84. Council Directive 2001/37/EC, art. 3, 2001 O.J. (L 194) 26, 29.
85. For this reason the directive was considered a de facto export ban on the grounds that noncomplying cigarettes exported to non-E.U. countries could be illegally re-imported into the European
Union creating new barriers to trade and thus undermining the other provisions of the directive.
86. The general warnings constitute up to thirty-five percent of the surface area on the front and fifty
percent of the surface area on the back (depending upon the number of languages in which a given country must publish the warnings). The directive also calls for the European Commission to adopt rules for
the use of color photographs or other illustrations to explain the health consequences of smoking. Council
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the use of adjectives, such as "mild" or "light," which might give8 7the impression that certain tobacco products were less harmful than others.
British American Tobacco (Investments) Ltd. ("BAT"), Imperial Tobacco,
and Japan Tobacco ("JT") sought U.K. judicial review of the British government's intention to incorporate the directive into domestic law, arguing that
the directive was incompatible with E.U. law. 88 The national court sought
guidance from the ECJ on the validity of the measure's legal basis, its compatibility with certain fundamental rights and principles, and its scope of
application.
Similar to many harmonization measures promoting the common market, 89 the Tobacco Products Directive stated in its preamble that "[t]here
[were] still substantial differences between the Member States' laws, regulations and administrative provisions on the manufacture, presentation, and
sale of tobacco products which impede[d] the functioning of the internal
market. '"90 However, it offered little proof of such disparities, even when presented with evidentiary requests by the Legal Affairs Committee of the European Parliament during the legislative process. 91
However, in the Tobacco Products Judgment, the Court upheld the Tobacco Products Directive, stating:
[A]s regards the question whether the Directive was adopted in keeping
with the principle of subsidiarity, it must first be considered whether
the objective of the proposed action could be better achieved at Community level ....[The] Directive's objective is to eliminate the barriers
raised by the differences which still exist between the Member States'
laws ... on ...tobacco products, while ensuring a high level of health
protection ....Such an objective cannot be . .. achieved by the Member States individually and calls for action at Community level, as demonstrated by the multifarious development of national laws in this case.
proIt follows that, in the case of the Directive, the objective of the
92
posed action could be better achieved at [the] Community level.
The ECJ's position in the Tobacco Products Judgment was somewhat surprising in light of the Tobacco Advertising Judgment. Here, the ECJ held
that Article 95 of the EC Treaty was a valid legal basis for the directive and
could be deployed against threats to the market that had already emerged or
were "likely to emerge" at the time of its adoption. 93 The fact that the reguDirective 2001/37/EC, 9 3, 5, 2001 O.J. (L 194) 26.
87. For a more detailed analysis of the provisions of the directive, see Scott Crosby, The New Tobacco
Control Directive: An Illiberal and Illegal Disdainfor the Law, 27 EUR. L. REv. 177 (2002).
88. See British American Tobacco, 2002 E.C.R. at 1-11563, 9 24.
89. See, e.g., Council Directive 85/577/EC, pmbl., 1985 O.J. (L 372) 31 on "doorstep selling."
90. Council Directive 2001/37/EC, 2, 2001 O.J. (L 194) 26.
91. See Crosby, supra note 87. Crosby stresses that the Commission failed to prove that there was a favorable internal market purpose or effect.
92. British American Tobacco, 2002 E.C.R. at 1-11606, IT 180-183.
93. Id.at 1-11575, 9 65. It was therefore sufficient that distortions were likely to emerge. In contrast,
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lation also protected public health did not undermine its validity, since intraCommunity trade was at stake. The ECJ accepted the argument of AdvocateGeneral Leendert Geelhoed, who claimed that if the conditions triggering
Article 95 of the EC Treaty (the removal of probable obstacles to trade and
risks of distorted competition) were met, the protection of public health
could be a legitimate factor in adopting a Community directive.
The ECJ's holding also relied on other economic arguments. For example,
cigarettes manufactured for export had to conform to European requirements
because there was a risk of re-importation of non-compliant products. Regarding the ban on misleading descriptors, the Court held that the right to
property is not absolute and "its exercise may be restricted, provided that
those restrictions in fact correspond to objectives of general interest pursued
by the Community and do not constitute a disproportionate and intolerable
94
interference, impairing the very substance of the rights guaranteed.
Many commentators believed that after the Tobacco Advertising Judgment,
the Community legislature would be forced to interpret Article 5.1 of the
EC Treaty narrowly and redefine requirements for minimum harmonization. 95
That judgment seemed to enforce the idea that deference to European federalism varied depending on the public health or free market context. However, the Tobacco Products Judgment casts doubt on the decentralization of
power in the European Union. Furthermore, the judgment undermines the
idea that the Community decisionmaker is mostly driven by a free market or
deregulatory rationale, employing only negative integration.
C. More To Come: Litigation on the New Tobacco Advertising Directive
The ECJ has yet another opportunity to interpret a tobacco directive and
clarify the allocation of competences in the European Union. On September
10, 2003, Germany submitted an application to the ECJ requesting annulment of Articles 3 and 4 of the second tobacco advertising directive, which
banned tobacco advertising and sponsorship in print media, on the Internet,
and on the radio. 96 Germany does not challenge the ban on sponsorship events
with cross-border effects. As in the first challenge, Germany argues that the
Community does not have sufficient legal basis for the prohibition on advertising and sponsorship contained in Articles 3 and 4. 97 Germany claims that
in the Tobacco Advertising Judgment, the ECJ said that the market distortions had to be "appreciable."
Case C-376/98, Federal Republic of Germany v. Parliament and Council, 2000 E.C.R. 1-8419, 1-8529,
106.
94. British American Tobacco, 2002 E.C.R. at 1-11598, 149.
95. The judgment "appearfed] to insist that a harmonisation measure must ensure access to the market of conforming imported goods, and confine[d] the application of stricter rules to domestic goods
alone." Stephen Weatherill, Pre-emption, Harmonisation and the Distribution of Competence to Regulate the
Internal Market, in THE LAW OF THE SINGLE EUROPEAN MARKET 41, 61 (Catherine Barnard & Joanne
Scott eds., 2002).
96. Case 380/03, Federal Republic of Germany v. Parliament and Council, 2003 O.J. (C 275) 31, 3132; Council Directive 2003/33/EC, 2003 O.J. (L 152) 16.
97. See Information Note from the Legal Service of the Council of the European Union on Case C-
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Article 95 of the EC Treaty cannot be used as a legal basis, since the contested provisions relate "almost exclusively [to] ...factual situations with
no cross-border effect" and that therefore "there are neither actual impediments to trade or any discernible distortion of competition."98 Germany argues
that given this, "the contested provisions do not in fact pursue the goal of
improving the internal market but rather the protection of health." 99 As
such, they constitute an "infringement of the prohibition on harmonization
in Article 152(4)(c)" of the EC Treaty.100
Germany also claims that "the substantive amendments made by the Council
following the Opinion of the Parliament give rise to a claim that the Parliament's rights under the co-decision procedure under Article 251 EC were
infringed."''1 During the directive's adoption, the Council made changes to
the text of the directive but failed to send the revised text to the European
Parliament for a second reading. Instead, following the political agreement
in the Council on the Parliament's text, the legal and linguistic experts reviewed the different language versions and decided on numerous unilateral
changes. Most of these changes were clearly based on linguistic considerations.
However, the final draft agreed upon by the legal and linguistic experts included a new provision. This addition required Member States to "communicate to the Commission the text of the main provisions of national law
which they adopt[ed] in the field covered by this Directive" and entered the
directive into force "on the day of its publication."'"0 2 The revised directive
was adopted without discussion in the Council on March 27, 2003 and published in the OfficialJournalof the European Union on June 20, 2003.103
Importantly, the manner by which the directive became law is contrary to
the established practice of involving the European Parliament in the legislative process. This process has come to "reflect[ ] a fundamental democratic
principle. 10 4 In fact, it has become so central to the promulgation of E.U.
law that it has been argued that a disregard of the EC Treaty's rules regarding the participation of the European Parliament in the legislative process
justifies an action for annulment.10 5
This was a strong argument undermining the directive's validity. When the
Council's Office of Legal Service realized the extent of the unapproved changes
and the likelihood that Germany would win the case on these procedural
grounds, the Council rushed to amend the directive by deleting Article 10(2)
380/03, art. 3, no. 14297/03, JUR 431, SAN 232 (Nov. 4, 2003) (on file with Harvard International
Law Journal).
98. Germany, 2003 O.J. (C 275) 31, 31.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 32.
102. Council Directive 2003/33/EC, arts. 10(2), 11, 2003 O.J. (L 152) 16, 19.
103. Id.
104. Case C-300/89, Commission v. Council, 1991 E.C.R. 1-2867, 1-2868, 2.
105. See Ingolf Pernice, Einigungsmdngel im EU-Mitentscheidungsverfahren, 24 EUROPAISCHE ZEITSCHRIFTr FOR WIRTSCHAFTSRECHT [EuZW] 743 (2004).
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and modifying Article 11.106 It remains unclear, however, whether the Court
will deliver a ruling on the basis of the amended text or on the basis of the
text as challenged by Germany.
Private parties claiming individual and direct interest have also challenged
the directive in its entirety. For example, in a 2003 filing, Niirburgring
GmbH requested, pursuant to Article 230 of the EC Treaty, that the Court
annul the directive because its adoption violated the procedure set out in
Article 251.107 The applicant alleged that the directive was adopted with
procedural irregularities because Article 95 of the EC Treaty did not provide
an adequate legal basis, and that the legal basis that did exist was used merely
to circumvent the prohibition on harmonizing health policy laid down in
Article 152( 4 )(c) of the EC Treaty. 10 8 Moreover, the applicant alleged that
the wording of Article 5(1) of the directive (which banned tobacco advertising in sponsorship events with cross-border implications) contravenes the
principle of certainty10 9 and that the directive infringes on both the Subsidiarity Principle and the applicant's right to property. 110
By the end of 2005 the ECJ should deliver judgments on the challenges
to the new directive. The rulings will elucidate the scope of Community
competence on public health regulation and, more importantly, will confirm
or deny the shift in European federalism suggested in the Tobacco Products
Judgment.
III.

THE EUROPEAN CONSTITUTION AND ITS PUBLIC HEALTH PROVISION

A. The Constitutionalizationof Tobacco
The Laeken European Council in December 2001 asked the European
Constituent Assembly responsible for drafting the E.U. Constitution to address and clarify the competence issue once and for all: "The important thing is
to clarify, simplify and adjust the division of competence between the Union
11
and the Member States." '
Unfortunately, the Draft E.U. Constitution and its ambiguous public health
provision' 12 do not clarify whether European federalism has entered a new
phase. However, it may be premature to draw any definitive conclusions. By
the time the Constitution is ratified by all of the Member States, new scenar-

106. SeeCorrigendum to Directive 2003133, 2004 O.J. (L 67) 34 (EC).
107. Case T-311/03, Niirburgring GmbH v. Parliament and Council, 2003 O.J. (C 275) 48, 49. See
also Information Note from the Legal Service, supra note 97.
108. Niirburgring GmbH, 2003 O.J. (C 275) at 49.
109. According to the principle of legal certainty, an E.U. law cannot be implemented in a manner
that violates legitimate expectations. See Case C-22/94, Irish Farmers Ass'n v. Minister for Agric., Food
and Forestry, Ireland, 1997 E.C.R. 1-01809, 1-01839,
25. See also Case 265/85, Van den Bergh en
Jurgens BV v. Commission, 1987 E.C.R. 1155, 1181, 44.
110. Niirburgring GmbH, 2003 O.J. (C 275) at 49.
111. Presidency Conclusions, European Council Meeting at Laeken (Dec. 14-15, 2001), supra note 7,
at 22.
112. DRAFr E.U. CONSTITUTION, art. 111-278.
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ios could emerge, especially in light of the recent E.U. enlargement. 113 Given
that many of these countries will hold referenda in the near future on the
Draft E.U. Constitution, and that their citizens may demand alterations to
the document before giving their assent, the text has not been finalized. The
Public Health Article nevertheless marks the first occurrence of tobacco in a
constitutional text. It is in accordance with the Subsidiarity Principle and
the general trend of setting firm, constitutional limits on the European Union's legislative competence as enumerated in Part I, Title III of the Constitution.
At least on its face, the Public Health Article seems to ensure that public
health will remain an area in which E.U. intervention will only be of a complementary and supportive nature." 4 The constitutional provision that explicitly excludes harmonization appears to duplicate the wording of Article
152(4 )(c) of the current EC Treaty. Thus, very limited powers are given to
the Community to harmonize health legislation. Only one of these powers
appears applicable to tobacco. Article III-278(4)(d) of the Draft E.U. Constitution empowers the Community to harmonize legislation relating to "monitor115
ing, early warning of and combating serious cross-border threats to health."
Although tobacco may be considered a "serious cross-border threat to health,"
it is unlikely that Article III-278(4)(d) will provide the Community with a
general power to harmonize tobacco legislation on public health grounds.
Informal talks with drafters of the Constitution suggest that the provision
was intended to address new health threats-outbreaks of communicable
diseases, such as Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome, and contaminations of
the food chain, such as Bovine Spongiforme Encephalopathia. If this interpretation is correct, then Article IHI-278 will not give the Community power to
adopt harmonizing tobacco legislation unless disparities in the functioning
of the internal market are first identified.
The expression "serious cross-border threats to health" is repeated in Paragraph l(b).116 Some believe this paragraph could cause concern for the tobacco industry. Although the application of the precautionary principle 17 in
the field of public health has already been accepted for a long time, as shown
by ECJ caselaw regarding various food-scare cases, 118 this provision seems to
go a step further. In fact, expressions such as "prevention" and "early warn-

113. On May 1, 2004, the European Union was enlarged from fifteen to twenty-five Member States.
See, e.g., Europa, The History of the European Union-2004 at http://europa.eu.int/abc/history/2004/indexen.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2005).
114. DRATr E.U. CONSTITUTION, art. 111-278, 5.
115. Id. art. III-278(4)(d).
116. Id. art. III-278(lXb).
117. The precautionary principle states that "where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage
to the environment, lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing costeffective measures to prevent environmental degradation." European Environment Agency--Glossaryprecautionary principle, at http://glossary.eea.eu.int/EEAGlossary/P/precautionaryprinciple (last visited
Apr. 20, 2005).
118. See, e.g., Case C-180/96, BSEJudgment, 1998 E.C.R. 1-02265.
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ing" could possibly be used as justification for intervention at a very early
stage, when the level of scientific doubt on the existence of a certain risk is
higher than the level accepted by law. In practice, this could mean a further
shifting of the burden of proof from the legislator to the challenging parties
and a weakening of the Subsidiarity Principle. Health Commissioner David
Byrne has already said that "[the new Constitution reflects this concern, by
specifically providing for EU measures to address tobacco smoking." 1 9 Consequently, it is possible to envisage a situation in which the legislature adopts
measures to counter a "serious cross-border threat" to health without submitting any proof as to the scientific certainty of the threat.
Furthermore, the requirement that the threats be cross-border did not exist under the former Article 152, pushing the legislature to use Article 95
instead. Although this appears to reduce E.U. competence-since intervention in purely national situations is not possible-it could prove troubling
for the industry. The cross-border effect requirement in Article 95 was
meant to serve as a legal basis for establishing the internal market, but in
practice was used to circumvent Article 152(4)(c) of the EC Treaty. Institutions in the future may attempt to use a combination of internal market
provisions and Paragraph 1(b) of the Public Health Article as a legal basis
for harmonizing public health.
Lastly, the language of Paragraph 5 of the Public Health Article is somewhat indefinite. It first mentions "incentive measures" designed to protect
public health, but then refers only in general terms to "measures" that should
have as their "direct objective" the protection against tobacco abuse. 120 This
ambiguity may reflect a sentiment that mere incentive measures are insufficient
when addressing tobacco use. Because harmonization remains legally impossible, the ECJ will again be forced to clarify this point.
B. Conflicting Scenarios in Interpretingthe European Constitution
Although the Draft E.U. Constitution has yet to be finalized, it is already
evident that the document's public health provisions attempt to reaffirm the
limits of tobacco regulation harmonization. They reinforce the widespread
perception that institutional competence is tied to the policy objectives pursued by each regulatory measure. This perception is highly problematic because, as ambivalent ECJ jurisprudence demonstrates, harmonization of tobacco advertising, labeling or manufacturing in order to promote the free
market necessarily affects national public health and social goals. Both free
market and social welfare claims can be made at either the Community or
121
the Member State level.
119. David Byrne, ENABLING GOOD HEALTH FOR ALL: A REFLECTION PROCESS FOR A NEW EU
HEALTH STRATEGY 8 (2004), available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/health/ph-overview/Documents/byme_
reflection en.pdf(last visited Apr. 20, 2005).
120. DRAFT E.U. CONSTITUTION, art. 111-278,

5.

121. For an analysis of the relation between different policy arguments in adjudication, see DUNCAN
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Furthermore, the rationale behind the public health/free market dichotomy is untenable. The perception that only granting greater Member State
power will result in higher public health standards, and that only expanding
Community competence will result in a more liberal market, is implausible.
There are at least two distinct scenarios that can emerge from the interpretation of the Public Health Article that are incompatible with this perception.
In one scenario, the Community may still legislate on tobacco in areas that
enhance the free market, even though it will have to demonstrate that its
proposed legislation is truly a market corrective. But as in the Tobacco Products
Directive scenario, once this burden is satisfied, the Community may consider public health as a factor in setting regulations. If this happens, the
constitutional provision backfires. Disgruntled minorities, concerned about
the proper limits of Community competence, will then challenge Community
legislation, relying on the express constitutional prohibition against harmonizing tobacco regulation.
In the second scenario, the constitutionalization of tobacco may allow
Member States to maintain idiosyncratic public health standards, even if they
are forced to operate under the doctrines of mutual recognition and maximum harmonization. These Member States could employ the constitutional
prohibition on harmonization as a shield, impeding such harmonization and
suppressing public health standards.
CONCLUSION

In 2001, the Laeken Declaration reiterated Member States' concerns about
the increasing power of the Community legislature. 22 The subsequent incongruity between the Tobacco Advertising Judgment and the Tobacco Products Judgment underscores the tension between harmonization of Member
States' laws and the allocation of competences in the European Union.
Although the Draft E.U. Constitution attempts to resolve these tensions,
it has not succeeded. Instead, the nebulous nature of the Public Health Article has set the stage for future struggles over the allocation of competences.
On the one hand, it calls for "incentive measures" to address cross-border
health scourges and "measures" to protect public health from tobacco consumption and alcohol abuse, and demands that these measures be achieved
without "any harmonisation of the laws and regulations of the Member
States."'"2 3 On the other hand, it leaves undetermined exactly how much
power the Community members will allocate to Brussels and how much they
will reserve for themselves. Moreover, in prohibiting the Community from
harmonizing public health, the Draft E.U. Constitution reinforces the belief
in a public health/private market dichotomy-a dichotomy that the history
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122. Presidency Conclusions, European Council Meeting at Laeken (Dec. 14-15, 2001), supra note 7.
123. DRAFT E.U. CONSTITUTION, art. 111-278.
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of tobacco regulations and corresponding ECJ jurisprudence reveal as illusory. By maintaining this separation, the Constitution does little to resolve
European federal struggles.
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